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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 15, 1983, the sovereign independence of the Turkish Cypriot people 
was formally asserted:) "Expressing the legitimate and irrepressible will of the Turkish 
Cypriot people ... we hereby declare before the world and history the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state.'" Turkish Cypriot 
leader Rauf Denktash trembled with emotion when he thus addressed the Turkish 
Cypriot Assembly,3 but Greek Cypriots maintained, with at least some evidence to support 
their view, that the Denktash move had been orchestrated by the Republic of Turkey.' 
* Professor of Law, School of Law, St. Thomas University. 
) Turk Cypriots Will Draft .Constitution, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 4, 1983, at 14A, col. 1. 
2 Davidson, The Reversible Republic, TIME, Nov. 28, 1983, at 38. 
3 Rogal, A New State of Tension, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1983, at 58. 
4 [d. "As the armorer and paymaster of Turkey, the United States may not have given a green 
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The move undermined United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar's 
work toward a settlement between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. 
Upon an August 1983 intercommunal talks breakdown the Secretary-General had 
pushed for renewed negotiations, and an early 1984 summit was to have taken place 
between Mr. Denktash and Cypriot President Spiros Kyprianou in the presence of the 
Secretary-GeneraP 
Both Turkish Cypriot leaders and top level Republic of Turkey officials stressed that 
the independence decision was irreversible.6 By December 2, 1983, the legislature of the 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, the autonomous administration that preceded the 
newly-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, by a vote of 26 to 14 established a 
seventy member constituent assembly to draft a constitution for the newly proclaimed 
republic.7 
Bangladesh and the Republic of Turkey had extended recognition by December 4, 
1983,H but Denktash accused the United States of a political embargo against his republic.9 
He said the independence move resulted directly from the Greek Cypriots' move of May 
1983 for a United Nations General Assembly mandate for extending their legaljurisdic-
tion over all of Cyprus. IO 
This fresh Cyprus development suggests that there could be merit today in a reap-
praisal of the 1960-1963 Republic of Cyprus Constitutional partnership of Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot. The current crisis most effectively can be dealt with if the lessons of 
that hopeful Republic of Cyprus Constitution are learned. 
The following pages outline, in a critical perspective, the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus 
and the stresses to which it was put. It will be seen that this Cyprus Constitution, premised 
upon the concurrent majority theory of popular government refined by and identified 
with America's Senator John C. Calhoun, afforded an intercommunal partnership exper-
iment. Review of this history could suggest that future constitution draftsmen in Cyprus 
and elsewhere might reconsider utilization of the concurrent majority device. It is proper 
to identify the concurrent majority principle with constitutional democracy in the phrase 
"constitutional majority rule": Calhoun pointed out that a concurrent majority require-
ment is an essential element of every constitutional democracy of whatever form. 
light to the U.D.1. [Unilateral Declaration of Independence], but it most certainly did not flash a red 
one." Editorial, Turkey's Big Bite, NATION, Nov. 26, 1983, at 522. On the other hand: 
Some say the declaration was a maneuver to enhance Denktash's position with 
Turkey. The positions of the Turkish-Cypriot leader have often differed from those of 
Ankara in recent months. According to sources close to the intercommunal negotia-
tions, Denktash feared that Turkey might try to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus 
problem directly, ignoring his wishes and without consultation. By presenting Ankara 
with a fait accompli Denktash has, according to this argument, eliminated this possibil-
ity. 
Bruce, Greece moves to save face in crisis with Turkish Cyprus, Christian Sci. Mo~., Nov. 18, 1983, at 11, 
col. 3. 
2. 
5 Wiznitzer, u.N. resigned to Turkish-Cypriot move, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 17, 1983, at 11, col. 1. 
6 Cohen, Turks confident about new Cypriot nation, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 22, 1983, at 11, cols. 1, 
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II. INDEPENDENT CYPRUS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Cyprus has through the ages been governed as a unit. 11 The island never has been 
under Greek rule,12 although the presence thereon of Greeks can be dated to the 
thirteenth century B.C.13 It was a portion of Magna Graecia, the great classical Greece. 14 
The island was successively conquered and ruled by Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, 
Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, Venetians, the Ottomans and the 
BritishY It was conquered during 1571 by the Ottoman Turks, and it is from that 
juncture that the emergence of a Turkish-speaking Muslim community on the island can 
be traced. 16 The Greek population attained majority status only in the lifetime immedi-
ately preceding independence.u 
Ottoman rule endured until in 1878 Turkey leased Cyprus to the British, thereby 
facilitating British promises to protect the Ottoman Empire from Russian aggression. IK In 
1923, in the wake of the First World War, Turkey transferred to the United Kingdom her 
sovereignty over Cyprus. 19 
Cyprus' status as a British Crown Colony ended in 1960.20 For over two millenia 
Cypriots had enjoyed no experience with self~government except at the local level.21 In 
1960 Cyprus for the first time in her history emerged as a sovereign state.22 
Until shortly prior to independence serious intercommunal conflict between Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots was nonexistent. 23 So recently as during the Second World War, 
relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots were peaceful and had been for as long as 
could be remembered.2.! 
N A TO Secretary General Paul Henri Spaak successfully arranged for representa-
tives of Britain, Greece and Turkey to open talks on Cyprus in Paris during December 
1958.25 The Paris meeting participants began to talk seriously for the first time about the 
notion of an independent CypruS.26 Talks were continued in Zurich with the participation 
1) Trombetas, The Republic of Cyprus: A Federation? in INSTITUTE FOR MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS, 
TJ;lE CYPRUS DILEMMA 7, 18 (1967). 
12 Karpat, Solution in Cyprus: Federation, in INSTITUTE FOR MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS, THE CYPRUS 
DILEMMA 35, 38. 
13 Crisis an Cyprus: 1974, A Study Mission Report Preparedfor the Use of the Subcomm. to Investigate 
Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Crisis an Cyprus: 1974]. 
14 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, THE CYPRUS QUESTION 10 (1967). 
15 Crisis on Cyprus: 1974, supra note 13, at 9. 
16 Id. 
17 Trombetas, supra note 11. at 38. 
18 Thomas & Thomas, The Cyprus Crisis 1974-75: Political-Juridical Aspects, 29 Sw. L.J. 513,514 
( 1975). 
19 Karpat, supra note 12, at 38. Britain had proclaimed the annexation of Cyprus in 1914. 
Cyprus became a Crown Colony in 1925. INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL Sn:DIEs,supra 
note 14, at 20. 
20 Trombetas, supra note 11, at 8. 
21 Ehrlich, Cyprus, the 'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 
1021, 1038 (1966). 
22 Id. at 1021. 
23 Worsley, Communalism and Nationalism in Small Countries: The Case of Cyprus, in SMALL STATES 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 1,2 (rev. ed. 1979). 
24 Caradon, Cyprus: The Driji to Disaster, in AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE, CRISIS ON CYPRUS 59 
(from Worldview, December 1974). 
25 CYPRUS: A COUNTRY STUDY 3D 36-37 (F. Bunge ed. 1980). 
26 ld. at 37. 
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of Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Turkish Premier Menderes. Provisional agree-
ment on an independent Republic of Cyprus was reached on February 11, 1959.27 
The Greek and Turkish governments in all likelihood felt that they adequately 
represented the island's two communities, and there is much history to underpin such a 
judgment.28 As it transpired, Greek Cypriots expressed disappointment because enosis 
had been frustrated.29 The Turkish Cypriot view had been that if Great Britain were to 
surrender sovereignty over the island, it should be returned to the island's former owner, 
Turkey;30 the greatly outnumbered Turkish Cypriots, however, welcomed the indepen-
dence agreements and relinquished their defensive earlier demand for taxim - the 
partition of Cyprus.31 
On August 16, 1960, Cyprus became an independent republic32 with the exception of 
two areas identified as military bases over which British sovereignty was retained.33 The 
new republic was admitted to the United Nations on September 21, 1960;34 at the 
Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference of March 13, 1961, Cyprus became an 
independent member of the British Commonwealth;35 and on May 24, 1961, Cyprus 
became the sixteenth member of the Council of Europe.36 The Constitution of Cyprus, 
plus the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance 
signed on August 16, 1960, constitutes an international treaty.37 
Ill. THE PEOPLES OF CYPRUS 
According to the 1960 official census the 574,103 Cypriots encompassed 446,362 
Greeks, 104,333 Turks, and 23,318 others, including English, Maronites, Gypsies and 
Armenians38 in a land about the same size as Lebanon (or only half the size of New 
Jersey).39 The Greek-speakers follow the Greek Orthodox religion and the Turkish-
speakers are Muslims.4o A common linguistic, religious, and national identity singles out 
the Turkish minority from the Greek majority.41 
27 Doumas, The 1960 Constitution of Cyprus: Some Observations, SOUTHERN Q., Oct. 1970, at 67,71. 
28 T. EHRLICH, CYPRUS 1958-1967: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF LAW 47 n.18 (1974). 
29 F. Bunge, supra note 25, at 37. Enosis means Cyprus's "union with Greece." Adams, The First 
Republic of Cyprus: A Review of An Unworkable Constitution, W. POL. Q. 475,482 (1966); Doumas, supra 
note 27, at 69; Crisis on Cyprus: 1974, supra note 13, at 9. 
30 Z. NEDJATIGIL, CYPRUS: CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND DEVELOPMENTS 3 (1977). 
31 F. Bunge, supra note 25, at 37. Taksim (or taxim) means the partition of Cyprus. Doumas, 
supra note 27, at 70 (Taksim); S. KYRIAKIDES, CYPRUS: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CRISIS GOVERNMENT 
49 (1968) (taxim). 
32 R. STEPHENS, CYPRUS: A PLACE OF ARMS 168 (1966). "Under the Cyprus Act, 1960,8 & 9 Eliz. 
2, c. 52, Queen Elizabeth, by Order in Council, named August 16, 1960, as the date of Cypriot 
independence." Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1033 n.54 (citing Stat. Instr. 1960, No. 1368). 
33 Trombetas, supra note II, at 7. 
34 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 168. 
35 Evriviades, The Legal Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 227, 238 (1975). Marias 
L. Evriviades is Press Counselor of the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus. Evriviades, Letter to the 
Editor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 9, 1984, at 4. 
36 EDS. OF DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, CYPRUS - Old Problem, New Crisis 28 (1964) 
[hereinafter CYPRUS - Old Problem, New Crisis]. 
37 Theodrides, The United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFlCYP), 31 INT'L & COMPo 
L.Q. 765 (1982). 
38 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 12. 
39 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 169; Crisis on Cyprus: 1974, supra note 13, at 9. 
40 Thomas & Thomas, supra note 18, at 513. 
41 Trombetas, supra note 11, at 16. 
1984] THE 1983 CYPRUS CRISIS 5 
Maronite, Armenian, and Roman Catholic Cypriots (the latter known in Cyprus as 
Latins) were, after the promulgation ofthe Constitution, included in the Greek register.42 
Compare the situation - albeit not directly germane to Cyprus - presented by the 
exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey negotiated after the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923. Professor Bernard Lewis has pointed out that many of the Greeks 
leaving Turkey spoke not Greek but Turkish, while Turks leaving Greece spoke not 
Turkish but Greek: "The uniformity was that the 'Greeks' were Christian and the 'Turks' 
were Muslim."43 
Cyprus is comprised of 634 separate communities - 619 villages, 9 suburbs, and 6 
towns. It is divided into six districts named after the main town in each: 
1. Famagusta, with 91.371 (82.81%) 
Greeks and 18,967 (17.19%) Turks. 
2. Kyrenia, with 26,264 (85.94%) 
Greeks and 4,298 (14.06%) Turks. 
3. Larnaca, with 43,961 (77.68%) 
Greeks and 12,630 (22.32%) Turks. 
4. Limassol, with 85,918 (86.41%) 
Greeks and 13,510 (13.59%) Turks. 
5. Nicosia, with 157,236 (79.42%) 
Greeks and 40,753 (20.58%) Turks. 
6. Paphos, with 43,946 (75.61 %) 
Greeks and 14,175 (24.39%) Turks.44 
The arable land in Cyprus consists of 3,197,748 donums (a donum= 0.227 acre). 
The Turks held but 652,486 donums, or 20 percent of the total.45 The average annual per 
capita income during the 1960s was 400 dollars, but most of the inhabitants lived on farms 
and subsisted upon approximately 200 dollars per year.46 
Britain left behind good roads, a high rate of literacy, and an efficient and incorrupt 
administration.47 The economy of Cyprus is usually compared with that of the politically 
highly stable Israel.48 During the 1960-1963 period the Cypriots' per capita national 
income of 400 dollars per year was higher than that of any nation in the eastern 
Mediterranean but Israel.49 By 1973, the last year prior to the mainland Turkish invasion, 
the per capita income had reached $1,313.50 
The Turkish Cypriot element of the populace was not and never had been concen-
trated in any single area.51 Of a total of 627 villages, 123 had been purely Turkish, 112 
had been mixed, and the balance were pure Greek.52 The colonial period saw a steady 
42 Doumas. supra note 27, at 74; Bunge. supra note 25. at 158. 
43 Cyprus, Once More. Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1983, at 32, col. 1 (citing B. LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF 
MODERN TURKEY). 
44 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 12. 
45 [d. at 13. 
46 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1024. 
47 [d. at 1028; R. STEPHENS, supra note 32. at 17l. 
48 Crisis on Cyprus: 1974, supra note 13, at 9. 
49 CYPRUS - Old Problem, New Crisis, supra note 36. at 28. 
50 Crisis on Cyprus: 1974, supra note 13. at 9. 
51 F. Bunge. supra note 25, at 40; P. POLYVIOU, CYPRUS: THE TRAGEDY AND THE CHALLENGE 115 
(1975). 
52 P. POLYVIOU, id. 
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decline in the number of mixed villages, probably due to the establishment of separate 
schools for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot children respectively. This meant that 
small groups of minority families in a mixed village had to move to a "majority" village for 
their children's education.53 
Cyprus constituted "an ethnographical fruitcake in which the Greek and Turkish 
currants were mixed up in every town and village and often in every street."54 In no 
portion of Cyprus of any considerable size were the Turkish Cypriots in the majority.55 
With the exception of some separate quarters in the main towns, the Turkish Cypriots 
had not been physically separated from the Greek. Even in towns where they lived apart, 
often Greeks and Turks worked in the same places.56 It was not until after fighting 
erupted in December, 1963, that the Turks began to move from some of the mixed 
villages and to concentrate in the Nicosia region.57 
IV. THE DIPLOMATIC VARIABLES 
A. The Mainland Factors 
Historically, the political plight of Cyprus has been determined by the major powers 
on the mainland.5H Most Greek Cypriots think of themselves as Greeks living on Cyprus. 
The Turkish Cypriot view of Turkey as their fatherland is the same.59 
The Greece-Turkey negotiations of 1959 saw the Greek position strong because 
eighty percent of Cyprus was Greek and a Greek Cypriot campaign for enos is had eroded 
the British will to hold Cyprus. Turkey's strong bargaining weapon, however, was the 
prospect of British agreement to taxim if an independence compromise was not 
reached.60 Cyprus is only 43 miles from the Turkish coast,61 but the length of supply lines 
to Greece is greater than 500 miles.62 
Turkey has regarded the establishment of Greek rule over Cyprus as completing a 
circle about her southern border, and feared that Greece might exploit Cyprus as a 
potential springboard for attack;63 Cyprus has been styled "the cork in the bottle of 
53 Worsley, supra note 23, at 8. 
M Ehrlich,supra note 21, at 1091 (quoting FOLEY, LEGACY OF STRIFE: CYPRUS FROM REBELLION TO 
CIVIL WAR 87 (1964». 
55 Trombetas, supra note II, at 19. 
56 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 213. 
57 Id. at 183. 
58 Trombetas, supra note II, at 38. 
59 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1022. 
A plebiscite among Greek Cypriots in 1949 must have shattered any British 
illusions about perpetual rule - ninety-six percent of the eligible voters favored union 
with Greece. 
A year later the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus died and a new 
leader, Archbishop Makarios III, was chosen. Only thirty-seven years old, he quickly 
became the leader of the Greek Cypriot people in secular as well as spiritual affairs. 
Id. at 1026. 
60 Id. at 1031. British Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd admitted before the 
House of Commons that it was Turkey's threatened taxim which obliged the Greek Cypriots to 
accept the independence settlement: "Had partition not been brought in we should never have had 
the settlement which we have reached." Trombetas, supra note II, at 26-27 and 27 n.32 (quoting 
Hansard, Mar. 19, 1959, at 655). 
61 Trombetas, supra note II, at 36. 
62 Id. at 36, 46. 
63 Id. at 38. 
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Iskenderun."64 At the time, the cost of a Turkish intervention III Cyprus on a scale 
requisite to impose partition against the will of the natives backed by Greece would have 
been unrealistically high; Turkey was unlikely to try one unless there was an attempt at 
enosis or a genocide of Turkish Cypriots.65 The constitutional force accorded the Treaties 
of Guarantee and Alliance was not solely to protect the constitutional order in Cyprus but 
to meet the specific military needs of the three guarantor powers, particularly Britain and 
Turkey.66 
In short, the 1960 Constitution resulted from the politico-diplomatic interplay of 
population and geography. Robert Stephens found, 
1. There are four times as many Greek Cypriots as Turkish Cypriots on the 
island. 
2. Cyprus is ten times further from Greece than it is from Turkey. 
3. There are four times as many Turks as there are Greeks. As a Turkish 
Cypriot leader put it to me: 'Ethnographically our position is weak, geograph-
ically it is strong.'67 
The Constitution of Cyprus reflected the bargaining power of the interested parties. 68 
Independence eliminated Britain as a major factor in Cyprus disputation but did not 
end such disputation; it temporarily removed Cyprus issues from the international scene 
and placed them in the category of domestic disputes.69 Under the Treaty of Guarantee 
the Republic of Cyprus undertook to ensure its independence and refrain from participa-
tion in whole or part in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever.7o The 
Treaty of Alliance called for Cypriot-Greek-Turkish cooperation to defend the island 
against aggression, and the Treaty of Establishment for British control and sovereignty 
over two military bases.71 
For at least an interval during the implementation of the 1960 Constitution a 
favorable diplomatic climate obtained. During Cypriot President Makarios' September 
28-0ctober 2, 1962, state visit to Greece, Greek leaders made clear that they aimed to 
keep out of controversial domestic issues in Cyprus and expressed confidence that the 
Turkish government wished to do likewise.72 In November 1962 Turkey extended Presi-
64 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1092 (quoting N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1964, at 2, col. 2). 
65 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 211. 
66 Evriviades, supra note 35, at 241. 
67 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 210. 
The Turkish Community of Cyprus are a small minority, but only in the immediate 
area of Cyprus itself. In a wider context, since they can always call upon Turkey to come 
to their assistance, they are part of the majority. Likewise with the Greek Cypriot 
Community. In Cyprus itself, the Greek Cypriots are the overwhelming majority of the 
population but in the strategically relevant area they are a very small and helpless 
minority, at the complete mercy of Turkey, as has been made abundantly clear in the 
recent crisis. Cyprus has always been a victim of geography, and it is to be seriously 
regretted that shortsightedness on the part of the Greek Cypriot Community and 
incredible distortion of our political priorities obscured this fact. 
P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 95. 
68 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 166. 
69 Doumas,supra note 27, at 85. The Soviet Union always has opposed enos is because the Soviets 
speculate that leaving the matter to internal settlement could divide NATO and trigger war between 
Greece and Turkey. T. ADAMS & A. COTTRELL, CYPRUS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 12-13 (1968). 
70 Thomas & Thomas, supra note 18, at 515. 
71 [d. 
72 CYPRUS - Old Problem, New Crisis, supra note 36, at 33 (citing The Times (London), Oct. 1, 
1962). 
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dent Makarios an invitation for a state visit. Turkey impressed upon him that she would 
support the Makarios government so long as the provisions of the Cyprus independence 
agreements were implemented strictly.73 
B. The Milita'ry Factors 
The sensitive web of diplomatic relationships may have influenced the President's 
1963 decision not to simply abrogate the 1960 independence settlement or even to call for 
revision of all the related accords. Instead, he proposed only modification of the Con-
stitution 74: 
Looming over other potential Turkish reactions to a decision by the Arch-
bishop was the possibility of Turkish military intervention under Article IV 
of the Treaty of Guarantee. That provision authorized each Guarantor 
Power, after consultation with the others, 'to take action with the sole aim of 
re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.'75 
Great Britain had agreed to the Zurich proposals on several conditions, includ-
ing British sovereignty over two base areas on Cyprus. The draft Treaty of Alliance called 
for a tripartite military headquarters on the Republic's territory with 950 troops from 
Greece and 650 troops from Turkey.76 These forces were to be separate from the Cypriot 
national forces. 77 
Under Article I the High Contracting Parties were ". .. to cooperate for their 
common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by defence."78 Under 
Article II they undertook" ... to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirec~, against 
the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of CypruS."79 
Greece and Turkey were to maintain troops in Cyprus near the capital.80 During the 
crisis of December 1963 the Turkish Army contingent of 650 men stationed in Cyprus 
pursuant to the Treaty moved from its camp and assumed a position in support of the 
Turkish Cypriot community.81 Simultaneously, the 950 man mainland Greek contingent 
stationed on Cyprus pursuant to that Treaty moved to assist the Greek Cypriots.82 
V. CONCURRENT MAJORITY POPULAR GOVERNMENT 
Cyprus' history, her ethnic pluralism, and the mainland variables resulted in a 
Constitution based on the concurrent majority theory of popular government. A child of 
the eighteenth century American Revolution, concurrent majority theorist Senator Cal-
houn was a thoughtful proponent of popular rule: 
73 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 144. 
74 T. EHRLICH, supra note 28, at 46. "[I]n so far as an outside observer can determine, Arch-
bishop Makarios was the decision-maker in a sense that was not true of any other leader discussed 
in this essay." Id. at 39-40 (Ehrlich's emphasis). 
75 Id. at 51. 
78 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1032; P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 16. 
77 F. Bunge, supra note 25, at 38. 
78 Evriviades, supra note 35, at 251. 
79 Id. 
80 Doumas, supra note 27, at 75. 
81 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 145-46. 
82 Id. at 146. It elsewhere was reported that Greece had 850 soldiers stationed in Cyprus. CYPRUS 
- Old Problem, New Crisis, supra note 36, at 39 (from N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 26, 1963). 
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The right of suffrage, of itself, can do no more than give complete 
control to those who elect over the conduct of those they have elected .... ~3 
The more perfectly it does this, the more perfectly it accomplishes its 
ends; but in doing so, it only changes the seat of authority without counteract-
ing, in the least, the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of 
its powers. 
If the whole community had the same interests so that the interests of 
each and every portion would be so affected by the action of the government 
that the laws which oppressed or impoverished one portion would necessarily 
oppress and impoverish all others - or the reverse - then the right of 
suffrage, of itself, would be all-sufficient to counteract the tendency of the 
government to oppression and abuse of its powers, and, of course, would 
form, of itself, a perfect constitutional government. ... 84 
But such is not the case.~5 
9 
On newly independent Cyprus the right of suffrage obtained, but this did not in itself 
preclude any tendency of the government to abuse its powers. The whole Cyprus com-
munity was widely felt to divide into a Greek majority faction and a Turkish minority 
faction, with a risk that this majority would tend to oppress the minority: 
As, then, the right of suffrage, without some provision, cannot coun-
teract this tendency of government, the next question for consideration is, 
What is that other provision? This demands the most serious consideration, 
for of all the questions embraced in the science of government it involves a 
principle, the most important and the least understood, and when under-
stood, the most difficult of application in practice. It is, indeed, emphatically 
that principle which makes the constitution, in its strict and limited sense. 
From what has been said, it is manifest that this provision must be of a 
character calculated to prevent anyone interest or a combination of interests 
from using the powers of government to aggrandize itself at the expense of 
the others .... There is but one certain mode in which this result can be 
secured, and that is by the adoption of some restriction or limitation which 
shall so effectually prevent anyone interest or combination of interests from 
obtaining the exclusive control of the government as to render hopeless all 
attempts directed to that end. There is, again, but one mode in which this can 
be effected, and that is by taking the sense of each interest or portion of the 
community which may be unequally and injuriously affected by the action of 
the government separately, through its own majority or in some other way by 
which its voice may be fairly expressed, and to require the consent of each 
interest either to put or to keep the government in action. This, too, can be 
accomplished only in one way, and that is by such an organism of the 
government - and, if necessary for the purpose, of the community also - as 
will, by dividing and distributing the powers of government, give to each 
division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice 
in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution.86 (Calhoun's 
emphasis). 
The government of Cyprus was finely geared toward dividing and distributing the 
83 J. CALHOUN, A Disquisition on Government, reprinted in 1 REPORTS AND PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN 
C. CALHOUN 1, 13 (R. Cralle ed. 1968). 
8. [d. at 14-15. 
85 /d. at 15. 
86 [d. at 24-25 (Calhoun's emphasis). 
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powers of government to give to each division or interest, through its appropriate.organ, 
either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution. 
Calhoun would have approved the utilization of his concurrent m~ority theory not 
merely through extralegal political practice but as institutionalized in the Constitution: 
Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suffrage, consti-
tutes, in fact, the elements of constitutional government. The one, by render-
ing those who make and execute the laws responsible to those on whom they 
operate, prevents the rulers from oppressing the ruled; and the other, by 
making it impossible for anyone interest or combination of interests, or class, 
or order, or portion of the community to obtain exclusive control, prevents 
anyone of them from oppressing the other.87 
It is this negative power - the power of preventing or arresting the 
action of the government, be it called by what term it may, veto, interposition, 
nullification, check, or balance of power - which in fact forms the constitu-
tion. They are all but different names for the negative power. In all its forms, 
and under all its names, it results from the concurrent majority. Without this 
there can be no negative, and without a negative, no constitution. The asser-
tion is true in reference to all constitutional governments, be their forms what 
they may. It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, and 
the positive which makes the government. BB 
The concurrent majority system in the Cyprus Constitution served to prevent either the 
Greek or Turkish portion ofthe community from obtaining exclusive control and oppres-
sing the other. 
Numerous critics have averred, however, that the Cyprus Constitution frustrated 
national conciliation and facilitated confrontation. Christina K. Navarro noted, "The 
government dualism, so rigidly provided for in the constitution, merely served to rein-
force ethnic separatism between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots."B9 Political scientist 
Christos L. Doumas argued, "In retrospect, it seems that rational men could not have 
allowed such a scheme to be implemented."90 Oxford lecturer in law Polyvious B. Polyviou 
believes, "The 1960 Settlement could never have worked, whatever the patience or the 
spirit of compromise on either or both sides."91 
Contrast those claims with Calhoun's contention that the concurrent majority is a 
socially integrative device, and not a conflict generating device: 
It may be readily inferred, from what has been stated, that the effect of 
organism is neither to supersede nor diminish the importance of the right of 
suffrage, but to aid and perfect it. The object of the latter is to collect the 
sense of the community .... It is only when aided by a proper organism that it 
can collect the sense of the entire community, of each and all its interests - of 
87 [d. at 25-26. 
88 [d. at 35. 
88 Navarro, Cyprus and the U.N.: A Case for Non-Military Collective Measures, 54 IND. L.J. 129,131 
(1978). 
90 Doumas, supra note 27, at 78. 
91 P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 38. U[T]he relevant provisions increased rather than reduced 
tension, did nothing to foster cooperation between the two Communities and, as a result, constituted 
in their totality a peculiarly structured and difficult to operate constitutional anomaly with no parallel 
elsewhere." P. POLYVIOU, CYPRUS IN SEARCH OF A CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
AND PROPOSALS, 1960-1975 20 (1976). 
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each, through its appropriate organ, and of the whole through all of them 
united .... 92 
It results, from what has been said, that there are two different modes in 
which the sense of the community may be taken: one simply by the right of 
suffrage, unaided; the other, by the right through a proper organism .... But 
one regards numbers only and considers the whole community as a unit 
having but one common interest throughout, and collects the sense of the 
greater number of the whole as that of the community. The other, on the 
contrary, regards interests as well as numbers - considering the community 
as made up of different and conflicting interests, as far as the action of the 
government is concerned - and takes the sense of each through its majority 
or appropriate organ, and the united sense of all as the sense of the entire 
community. The former of these I shall call the numerical or absolute ma-
jority, and the latter, the concurrent or constitutional majority. I call it the 
constitutional majority because it is an essential element in every constitu-
tional government, be its form what it may.93 
If the numerical majority were really the people, and if to take its sense 
truly were to take the sense of the people truly, a government so constituted 
would be a true and perfect model of a popular constitutional government; 
and every departure from it would detract from its excellence. But as such is 
not the case, as the numerical majority, instead of being the people, is only a 
portion of them, such a government, instead of being a true and perfect 
model of the people's government, that is, a people self-governed, is but the 
government of a part over a part - the major over the minor portion.94 
11 
Political theorist Vukan Kuic as recently as 1983 agreed that the concurrent majority 
can be an integrating mechanism: "[W]ith minds open to the ideal of brotherhood of 
men, we hardly can fail to recognize that Calhoun's principle of concurrent majority 
actually improves on Lincoln's definition of democracy by requiring it to be a government 
of all the people for all the people. "95 As Calhoun put it: "I am in favor of the government 
of the whole; the only really and truly popular government - a government based on the 
concurrent majority - the joint assent of all the parts, through their respective majority 
of the whole."96 Calhoun anticipates and transcends Lincoln by endorsing government of 
92 ]. Calhoun, supra note 83, at 27. 
93 Id. at 28. 
94 Id. at 30. A closely parallel discussion of Calhoun's concurrent majority obtains in Swan, 
Quasi-Constitutional Developments in Northem Ireland, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L. ]. 378 (1983). 
95 Kuic,John C. Calhoun's Theory of the "Concurrent Majority", 69 A.B.A.]. 482, 486 (1983). 
In 1830 Daniel Webster spoke about "the people's government, made for the people, 
made by the people, and answerable to the people." 
It's a summary that was picked up by other writers and speakers until it was 
distilled in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address into the simple and familiar words 
that government officials should read every day. 
Thermal, Secrecy in govemment is disdain for the electorate, Sunday News Journal (Wilmington, Del.), 
Feb. 28, 1984, at C9, col. 1. 
96 R. CURRENT, JOHN C. CALHOUN, 145-46 (1966) (citing LXXII Niles Nat'l Register, May 8, 
1847, at 148). 
By giving to each interest, or portion, the power of self~protection, all strife and 
struggle between them for ascendency is prevented, and thereby not only every feeling 
calculated to weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed, but the individual and 
the social feelings are made to unite in one common devotion to country. Each sees and 
feels that it can best promote its own prosperity by conciliating the good will and 
promoting the prosperity of the others. And hence there will be diffused throughout 
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all the people, by all the people, and for all the people.97 
VI. THE CONCURRENT MAJORITY ON CYPRUS 
The 1960 Constitution of Cyprus has been compared to a masterfully jewelled 
watch.9H It has been characterized as the most rigid on the globe; it surely was the most 
detailed; and with the possible exception of Kenya's Constitution, it was the most compli-
cated.99 Dr. Galo Plaza, eventually appointed Mediator by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations following the Cyprus crisis of December 1963, called the 1960 Constitu-
tion a "constitutional oddity."100 Because the island's problems were unlike those facing 
other constitution makers, this document is of a unique character; 101 it is often styled sui 
generis. 102 
Calhoun, an experienced national'°3 as well as sectional'°4 politician, was not imprac-
tical in delineating the theory of the concurrent majority. He warned that a successful 
Constitution must fit the nature of the relevant population. Writing as if alert to Cyprus' 
sensitive ties to both Greece and Turkey, he heeded all of the multitudinous relationships, 
external as well as internal, differentiating one people from another: 
A constitution, to succeed, must spring from the bosom of the commu-
nity and be adapted to the intelligence and character of the people and all the 
the whole community kind feelings between its different portions and, instead of 
antipathy, a rivalry amongst them to promote the interests of each other, as far as this 
can be done consistently with the interest of all. Under the combined influence of these 
causes, the interests of each would be merged in the common interests of the whole; 
and thus the community would become a unit by becoming the common center of 
attachment of all its parts. And hence, instead of faction, strife, and struggle for party 
ascendency, there would be patriotism, nationality, harmony, and a struggle only for 
supremacy in promoting the common good of the whole. 
J. CALHOUN, supra note 83, at 48-49. 
97 Dr. Trombetas quotes Lincoln approvingly in the Cyprus context: " 'Unanimity is impossible; 
the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissable; so that, rejecting the 
majority principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form, is all that is left.''' Trombetas, supra note 11, 
at 30 n.37 (quoting A. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (R. Basler ed. 1953)). 
The reader may decide whether pre-December 1963 Cyprus concurrent majority government 
afforded anarchy, and whether the post-December 1963 Cyprus government constituted despotism. 
98 'l.dams, supra note 29, at 475. 
The Constitution entered into effect on August 16, 1960, the day Cyprus became 
. ndependent. At no time was it ever submitted to popular referendum or plebiscite by 
the electorate or to ratification by any directly or indirectly elected representative 
legislature .. It remained in force in the republic in mid-1979, although several of its 
original provisions were modified by unilateral Greek Cypriot action in January 1964 .. 
F. Bunge, supra note 25, at 156. 
99 C. TORNARITIS, CYPRUS AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS 2D 63 (1980) 
(citing S. DESMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND iTs CONSTITUTIONS 285 (1964)). 
100 Z. NEDJATIGIL, supra note 30, at 13. 
101 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1037 (citing YDIT, INTERNATIONALIZED TERRITORIES 81 (1961)). 
102 P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 105; P. POLYVIOU, CYPRUS: CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION 
1960-198037 (1980); P. POLYVIOU, supra note 91, at 13, 25, 53. "In S. DESMITH, NEW COMMON-
WEALTH AND iTs CONSTITUTIONS 282-296 (1964), the author describes the constitutional arrange-
ments in Cyprus under the title, Cyprus: Sui Generis." Evriviades, supra note 35, at 241 n.67. 
103 J. WILTSE, JOHN C. CALHOUN: NATIONALIST, 1782-1828 (1944). 
104 J. WILTSE, JOHN C. CALHOUN: SECTIONALIST, 1840-1850 (1951). 
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multifarious relations, internal and external, which distinguish one people 
from another. If it does not, it will prove in practice to be not a constitution, 
but a cumbrous and useless machine which must be speedily superseded and 
laid aside for some other more simple and better suited to their condition. 
It would thus seem almost necessary that governments should commence 
in some one of the simple and absolute forms which, however well suited to 
the community in its earlier stages, must in its progress lead to oppression and 
abuse of power and finally to an appeal to force - to be succeeded by a 
military despotism - unless the conflicts to which it leads should be fortu-
nately adjusted by a compromise which will give to the respective parties a 
participation in the control of the government, and thereby lay the founda-
tion of a constitutional government to be afterwards matured and perfected. 
Such governments have been, emphatically, the product of circumstances. lo5 
13 
The pre-I960 differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were to be adjusted by 
compromises, found in the Constitution, to grant the respective parties participation in 
controlling the government. 
Commentators have agreed that the Cyprus Constitution was devised with an eye to 
the multifarious relations, internal and external, of the Cypriots. Found T.W. Adams of 
its framers: "It is apparent that these legalists did heed the warnings of history, inasmuch 
as they were wise enough not to force traditional enmities [sic] immediately together in 
the institutional framework of the first Republic. Thus, the constitution recognized and 
perpetuated the historic separateness of the two ethnic communities of the island."I06 
the island."I06 
New York University's Dr. Kemal H. Karpat agreed: 
The Constitution itself reflects the communal structure of Cyprus as it existed 
fo [sic] centuries. It recognized the basic fact that the Greek and Turkish 
communities had co-existed peacefully as separate entities and legalized it. 
Communal organization has been the way of life in many areas of the Middle 
East. Communal organization when not beset by unrestrained nationalist 
ambitions has succeeded in creating a social balance and peace in parts of the 
region. lo7 
A. The Concurrent Majority Cyprus Legislature 
The Constitution made the Republic a unitary state in form, but the community 
concepts thereof incorporated significant features of a federal arrangement within its 
institutional structure. 10M Article 86 provides that Cyprus' Greek and Turkish Com-
105 J. CALHOUN, supra note 83, at 79. 
106 Adams, supra note 29, at 475-76. 
107 Karpat, supra note 12, at 35, 41. "[T]he 1960 settlement represented an imaginative resolu-
tion of many difficult problems. Given patience and a spirit of compromise on each side, there seems 
no reason why it could not have worked. It was not a model of draftsmanship, but viewing the 
circumstances in which it was prepared, more could hardly have been expected." Ehrlich, supra note 
21, at 1039. "Despite substantial weaknesses, the settlement did represent an imaginative resolution 
of many difficult problems. Given patience and a spirit of compromise on each side, it might have 
worked. It is not a model of draftsmanship; but, viewing the circumstances, no mOTe could have been 
expected." T. EHRLICH, supra note 28, at 38. "For about two and a half years, the 1960 settlement 
worked reasonably well. The constitutional machinery for keeping the peace between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots did just that." [d. at 41. 
108 Trombetas, supra note 11, at 14-15,29. Contends William H. Riker: "The rule for identifica-
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munities respectively are to each elect a Communal Chamber.I09 Not dissimilarly, the 
Constitution of stable, prosperous Belgium provides for a Council and an Executive of 
Belgium's French community and a Council and an Executive of Belgium's Flemish 
community.IIO 
The competence of the Communal Chambers as outlined in Article 87 (1) primarily 
includes: 
(a) all religious matters; 
(b) all educational, cultural and teaching matters; 
(c) personal status; 
(d) the composition and instances ... of courts dealing with civil disputes 
relating to personal status and to religious matters; 
(f) imposition of personal taxes and fees on members of their respective 
Community in order to provide for their respective needs and for the 
needs of bodies and institutions under their control as in Article 88 
provided; 
(g) in matters where subsidiary legislation in the form of regulations or 
by-laws within the framework of the laws relating to municipalities will be 
necessary to enable a Communal Chamber to promote the aims pursued 
by municipalities composed solely of members of its respective Commu-
nity; 
(h) in matters relating to the exercise of the authority of control if producers' 
and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments and of supervi-
sion in their functions of municipalities consisting solely of their respec-
tive Community, vested in them by this Constitution. lIl 
Article 88 also provides for direct taxation by a Communal Chamber of its own 
community members.ll2 Not dissimilar to the powers of Cyprus' Communal Chambers 
are the powers to regulate by decree of Belgium's Community Councils.ll3 
The financial independence of each Community from the national government is 
reinforced by Article 108: 
(1) The Greek and the Turkish Communities shall have the right to 
receive subsidies from the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively for 
institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to the Greek 
or the Turkish Community respectively. 
(2) Also where either the Greek or the Turkish Community considers 
tion is: A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) 
each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee 
(even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own 
sphere." W. RIKER, FEDERALISM II (1964). 
Avers Prof. K.C. Wheare of Oxford University: "Does a system of government embody predom-
inantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities, each of which, in its own 
sphere, is co-ordinate with the others and independent of them? If so, that government is federal." 4 
K. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 33 (1964). Wheare's definition of federal government has "se-
cured the most support" of all such definitions of federal government. P. POLYVIOU, supra note 91, at 
393; P. POLYVIOU, supra note 102, at 222. 
109 CYPRUS CONST. art. 86. 
110 BELG. CONST. art. 59bis, § 1. 
111 CYPRUS CONST. art. 87(1)(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(g) and (h). 
112 CYPRUS CONST. art. 88. 
113 BELG. CONST. art. 59bis, §2-§4bis. 
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that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or clergy-
men ... for the functioning of its institutions, such Community shall have the 
right to obtain and employ such personnel to the extent strictly necessary to 
meet its needs as the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively may 
provide.H4 
15 
There is no mention in the Constitution of any conflict of interest or incompatibility 
in holding offices simultaneously in the House of Representatives and in a Communal 
Chamber.1l5 And again in stable Belgium, indeed, the Flemings - but not the Walloons 
- have so opted that their Flemish Council and Executive exercise the powers of both 
Belgium's (language bloc-oriented) Flemish Community and of her (geography-linked) 
Flemish Region. ll6 
Prior to the coming into force of the 1960 Constitution, the judicial system had for 
many years been functioning extremely well. Justice was administered impartially by both 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges on not communal, but jurisdictional criteria.117 
As Ehrlich points out,1l8 under the 1960 Constitution the Supreme Constitutional 
Court is to be comprised of a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot, and a neutral President 
not to be a Cypriot, Briton, Greek or Turk.u9 It is given jurisdiction to adjudicate finally120 
over numerous Constitutional issues referred to it by the President or Vice-President,!21 
over Constitutional issues raised in other courtS,!22 and over any complaint that an 
administrative act or omission was unconstitutional, unlawful, or an abuse of power.123 
The Supreme Constitutional Court could return measures to the Cyprus House of 
Representatives for reconsideration on the ground that they were discriminatory.124 
Article 125 (3) provides for the Supreme Constitutional Court to render final determina-
tions upon Public Service Commission deadlocks over filling public service positions.125 
The separation of powers doctrine is a basis of the Constitution,126 although that 
114 CYPRUS CONST. art. 108. The various levels of Cyprus government left her overgoverned. 
Doumas, supra note 27, at 78-79. This is the case today in stable little Belgium. J. FITZMAURICE, THE 
POLITICS OF BELGIUM: CRISIS AND COMPROMISE IN A PLURAL SOCIETY 137 (1983). 
115 Adams, supra note 29, at 480. However, Articles 70 and 101 appear contra to Adams. 
CYPRUS CONST. arts. 70 and 101. 
116 "The Flemish Community and Region have common institutions or, put another way, the 
Flemish Council and Executive exercise the powers of both the Flemish Community and the Region." 
J. FITZMAURICE, supra note 114, at 128-29. "Regions are a geographical concept, whereas the 
Communities are linguistic and cultural entities." Id. at 111. 
Yet as Catholic University of Louvain Faculty of Law Prof. Francis Delperee explained in Nicosia 
at the April 30-May 4, 1979, International Law Conference on Cyprus: 
And finally I would add, Mr. President, and this was the end of your question, I 
would add that the institutions of Belgium are not yet, and are far from being, a model 
for exportation. We have many problems. We are in the midst of revising our Constitu-
tion, and I hope that you will succeed with yours before we are through with ours. 
CYPRUS BAR COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL LAW CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS 230-31 (1981) (translation by M. 
Hirsch, J.D. cand., The Delaware Law School). 
117 P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 128. 
118 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1035-36. 
119 CYPRUS CONST. art. 133, (1) and (3). 
120 CYPRUS CONST. art. 136. 
121 CYPRUS CON ST. arts. 137-143. 
122 CYPRUS CONST. art. 144. 
123 CYPRUS CONST. art. 146. 
124 CYPRUS CONST. arts. 137-138. 
125 CYPRUS CONST. art. 125 (3). 
126 Explained President Makarios in his Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution: 
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principle was not enshrined impractically in the instrument.127 The House of Representa-
tives included thirty-five Greek Cypriot and fifteen Turkish Cypriot Representatives.128 
On July 31, 1960, in the first national elections to the new House of Representatives, 
thirty of the Greek Cypriot seats went to the Patriotic Front, which supported President 
Makarios. Fifteen seats were won by the Turkish National Party, which supported Vice-
President Kuchuk.129 
This House was to exercise all legislative powers but those expressly reserved to the 
Communal Chambers.13o There is also a concurrent majority feature in Article 78(2): 
Any modification of the Electoral Law and the adoption of any law 
relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall 
require a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek 
and the Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote. 131 
B. The Concurrent Majority Cyprus Executive 
Concurrent majority features appear in the executive branch also. Executive power 
not explicitly reserved to the President or Vice-President rested in the Council of Minis-
ters. 132 The Council was comprised of ten Greek and three Turkish Cypriotsl33 appointed 
by the Presidentl34 and the Vice-President respectivelyP5 
Council of Ministers decisions were by simple majority,I36 subject to the veto of 
Council decisions and of House of Representatives measures by either or both the 
Presidentl37 and the Vice-President. l3H These vetoes allowed for government through a 
The Constitution of Cyprus has been based on the doctrine of separation of powers 
between the Executive and the Legislature. The balance between them must be care-
fully maintained and friction avoided, if it is to work. 
INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 21. 
127 "It must be noticed that the Constitution recognizes and protects the independence of the 
House in a number of ways, e.g. by not granting the power to dissolve the House either to the 
President or the Vice-President; but, of course, it must not be assumed that some kind of impractical 
'separation of powers' doctrine is thereby enshrined in the Constitution." P. POLYVIOU,SUpra note 51, 
at 21. 
12" CYPRUS CONST. art. 62. 
129 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 171. 
130 CYPRUS CONST. art. 61. 
131 CYPRUS CONST. art. 78( 1) and (2). 
132 CYPRUS CONST. art. 54. 
133 CYPRUS CONST. art. 46. 
134 CYPRUS CONST. art. 48(a). 
135 CYPRUS CONST. art. 49(a). 
136 CYPRUS CON ST. art. 46. This Article opens: "The executive power is ensured by the President 
and the Vice-President of the Republic." "The word 'ensure' appears to have been taken from the 
concept of the French public law." C. TORNARITIS, supra note 99, at 45 n.100. 
137 CYPRUS CONST. art. 48(d) and (f), 50 and 57 (3). l. 
138 CYPRUS CONST. art. 49(d) and (f), 50 and 57(3). 
The cabinet discussions were conducted in English, the common language of the 
two communities. Kuchuk, in particular, whose foreign language is French rather than 
English, would find it difficult to keep up with the proceedings, especially the quick 
Greekjokes which could have seemed, however wrongly, to be at the Turks' expense. A 
proud and touchy Turkish minister, remembering who had once ruled the island, 
might well come out of a cabinet meeting fuming and muttering that the Turks used to 
skin archbishops alive in the old days. It must also have been difficult for the Greek 
Cypriots, who had never ruled themselves before, to restrain the impulse to show off 
their new power and put the Turks in their place. 
R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 173. 
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concurrent majority of the Greek Cypriot national majority and Turkish Cypriot minor-
ity, inasmuch as Article One provided in full: "The State of Cyprus is an independent and 
sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-
President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus 
respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided."!39 
Article 59 (3) provides: "The Ministers shall hold office in the case of the Greek 
Ministers until their appointment is terminated by the President of the Republic and in 
the case of the Turkish Ministers until their appointment is terminated by the Vice-
President of the Republic."!40 The Greek Cypriot Ministers derived their authority from 
the President; the Turkish Cypriot Ministers from the Vice-President.!4! These executive 
branch arrangements have no precise parallel elsewhere.!42 "The constitution supposedly 
establishes a 'presidential regime,' but this must be viewed rather skeptically. Perhaps it 
would be more correct to describe it as a Vice-Presidential one, so inflated are the powers 
of the Turkish Vice-President. ... "!43 
C. Calhoun and the Cyprus Executive 
The Cyprus Constitution provides for the election of the President and Vice-
President by the Greek and Turkish Communities respectively. Calhoun proposed that 
there be not one U.S. President, but two U.S. federal executive officers to be elected by 
the Northern and Southern sections respectively.!44 
Article 46 of the Cyprus Constitution in relevant part provides: "One of the following 
Ministries that is to say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the 
Ministry of Finance, shall be entrusted to a Turkish Minister. If the President and the 
Vice-President of the Republic agree they may replace this system by a system of rota-
tion."145 
Even as Article 46 looks to the likelihood of the Foreign Minister (and/or Defense 
Minister) being responsible to the Vice-President, so Calhoun suggested that one of the 
two U.S. federal executive officers be responsible for foreign affairs, and the other for 
domestic affairs. He suggested of the national executive branch: 
!39 CYPRUS CONST. art. 1. The Constitution adds: 
In the event of a temporary absence or a temporary incapacity to perform the 
duties of the President or of the Vice-President of the Republic, the President or the 
Vice-President of the House of Representatives ... shall act for the President or the 
Vice-President of the Republic respectively during such temporary absence or tempo-
rary incapacity. 
CYPRUS CONST. art. 36(2). For purposes of deputizing and replacing the President, the Turkish 
Cypriot Vice-President was not second in line as is generally accepted in Presidential systems. S. 
KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 59. This is the significance of Point Two of President Makarios' 1963 
Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution. INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, 
supra note 14, at 21. 
!4O CYPRUS CONST. art. 59(3). 
141 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 63. 
142 P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 26. 
143 P. POLYVIOU, supra note 102, at 20. 
144 J. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, reprinted in 
REPORTS AND PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 109, 391-92 (R. Cralle ed. 1968). The dying 
Calhoun had served as a South Carolina state legislator, as U.S. Congressman, Senator, Secretary of 
War, Secretary of State, and Vice-President. Whom do you think he saw in his mind's eye as the joint 
U.S. President from the South? 
143 CYPRUS CON ST. art. 46. 
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[Ilts powers, instead of being vested, as they now are, in a single officer, 
should be vested in two; to be so elected as that the two should be constituted 
the special organs and representatives of the respective sections in the execu-
tive department of the government, and requiring each to approve all the acts 
of Congress before they shall become laws. One might be charged with the 
administration of matters connected with the foreign relations of the country, 
and the other of such as were connected with its domestic institutions, the 
selection to be decided by 10t.146 
Calhoun might have welcomed the unparalleled Cyprus Constitutional arrangement 
whereby Greek Cypriot Ministers were to derive authority from the President, and the 
Turkish Cypriot Ministers from the Vice-President: 
But it is objected that a plural executive necessarily leads to intrigue and 
discord among its members, and that it is inconsistent with prompt and 
efficient action. This may be true when they are all elected by the same 
constituency and may be a good reason, where this is the case, for preferring a 
single executive, with all its objections, to a plural executive. But the case is 
very different where they are elected by different constituencies having 
conflicting and hostile interests, as would be the fact in the case under 
consideration. Here the two would have to act concurringly in approving the 
acts of Congress and separately in the sphere of their respective departments. 
The effect, in the latter case, would be to retain all the advantages of a single 
executive, as far as the administration of the laws were concerned; and, in the 
former, to insure harmony and concord between the two sections and, 
through them, in the government. 147 
Did the concurrent majority formulae in the Cyprus Constitution lead to discord 
inconsistent with efficient action? There were four great intercommunal policy divisions 
from August 1960 to December 1963: 1. formation of a Cypriot army; 2. public service 
appointments; 3. Cypriot personal income tax legislation; and 4. the establishment of 
separate Municipalities. 148 
146 J. CALHOUN, supra note 144, at 109, 392. 
147 Id. at 394-95. A dual federal executive was suggested relative to the proposed Second World 
War union of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth. C. STREIT, UNION Now WITH BRITAIN 42-45 
(1941). 
The reports of the mid-September 1983 final meeting of the Central Committee of Marxist 
Grenada's New Jewel Movement disclose that a Central Committeeman called upon to explain his 
vote against a two-person party leadership replied that: "He is not clear how the dialectics will unfold. 
He said that he has not seen it anywhere in the science." Krauthammer, Grenada and the End of 
Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1984, at 16, 17. The absence of dual-leadership theory in 
Marxism-Leninism contrasts sharply with its presence in liberal political theory. Wrote Leon Trotsky: 
"Lenin's methods lead to this: the party organization at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; 
then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organization; and finally a single 'dictator' 
substitutes himself for the Central Committee .... " 1. DEUTSCHER, THE PROPHET ARMED 90 (1954). 
148 T. EHRLICH, supra note 28, at 43-45; Adams, supra note 29, at 484-86; S. KYRIAKIDES, supra 
note 31, at 77-103; Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1041-43. 
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VII. THE CYPRIOT ARMY VETO 
A. The Evidence: Calhoun in the Dock 
As early as March 2, 1961, the Ministry of Defense issued a proclamation of its 
readiness to accept its initial enlistees.149 On the first enlistment date, 51 Greek Cypriots 
and 59 Turkish Cypriots went to the enlistment centers. 150 
The Council of Ministers voted to establish an army wherein soldiers from the Greek 
and Turkish communities would be integrated.151 The Turkish Cypriots argued that it 
would be difficult for Greek and Turkish Cypriot troops to be quartered together in view 
of their linguistic and religious differences.152 The Turkish Cypriot position was that the 
battalions could be mixed,153 but Vice-President Kuchuk wanted separate units in ele-
ments as large as a military company (some 150 men).154 Dr. Kuchuk vetoed the Council 
decision under his Article 49(d)155 and Article 50156 Vice-Presidential authority. 
The 1961 failure of the Constitutional administration of Cyprus to develop a Cypriot 
army might be thought conclusive evidence against the concurrent majority principle, 
belying these sunny promises of former U.S. Secretary of War Calhoun: 
The diversity of opinion is usually so great on almost all questions of 
policy that it is not surprising, on a slight view of the subject, it should be 
thought impracticable to bring the various conflicting interests of a commu-
nity to unite on anyone line of policy, or that a government founded on such 
a principle would be too slow in its movements and too weak in its foundation 
to succeed in practice. But plausible as it may seem at the first glance, a more 
deliberate view will show that this opinion is erroneous. It is true that, when 
there is no urgent necessity, it is difficult to bring those who differ to agree on 
anyone line of action. Each will naturally insist on taking the course he may 
think best, and, from pride of opinion, will be unwilling to yield to others. But 
the case is different when there is an urgent necessity to unite on some 
common course of action, as reason and experience both prove. When some-
thing must be done - and when it can be done only by the united consent of 
all- the necessity of the case will force to a compromise, be the cause of that 
necessity what it may. On all questions of acting, necessity, where it exists, the 
overruling motive, and where, in such cases, compromise among the parties is 
an indispensable condition to acting, it exerts an overruling influence in 
predisposing them to acquiesce in some one opinion or course of action. 157 
(Calhoun's emphasis). 
The necessity of an army might seem a properly overriding influence toward action. 
Does not failure to raise an army prove concurrent majority government too weak in its 
foundation to succeed in practice? 
149 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 93. 
150 ld. at 93 n.57 (citing Eleftheria (Nicosia), Mar. 3, 1961). 
151 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1041. 
152 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 93. 
153 ld. 
154 Adams, supra note 29, at 485. 
155 CYPRUS CONST. art. 49 (d). 
156 CYPRUS CONST. art. 50. 
157 J. CALHOUN, supra note 83, at 64-65. 
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B. The Verdict 
When Vice-President Kuchuk in October 1961 exercised his Constitutional veto to 
halt the raising of integrated forces, "Makarios then stated that the country could not 
afford an army anyway."15H As President Makarios himself framed the problem as late as 
the close of 1963 in his Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution: 
Under the Constitution the Army of the Republic must consist of 60% 
Greeks and 40% Turks. The Council of Ministers, by majority, decided that 
the organisational structure of the Army should be based throughout on 
mixed units comprising both Greeks and Turks. The Vice-President, who 
wanted the structure to be based on separate units of Greeks and Turks, 
exercised his right of veto against the above decision of the Council with the 
result that there is no decision on this matter and the Army has remained 
ineffective. 
In the case of the Army no great harm has resulted, since it is doubtful 
whether the Republic can really afford its expansion to 2,000 men at present 
and cope simultaneously with the heavy financial burdens of economic devel-
opment and expansion of educational and social services. But it is easy to 
envisage situations where exercise of the veto could result in more far-
reaching and damaging repercussions. 159 
In short, the President here admits that no great harm resulted from the army veto. 
By no means was the Calhoun promise of acquiescence in the face of necessity disproved. 
The Army veto, which in vacuo sounds catastrophic, proved only thrifty. As even harsh 
critic of the Constitution Adams conceded in his The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an 
Unworkable Constitution, "In view of the tripartite Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, a 
Cypriot army was far from essential."160 
Former War Secretary Calhoun might actually have applauded the veto of a nones-
sential army. He emphasized that a national military complex can present a perilous apple 
of discord encouraging avaricious factions to struggle desperately for the lucrative control 
of the government. 161 
158 F. Bunge, supra note 25, at 160. 
159 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 21. 
160 Adams, supra note 29, at 486. 
161 The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of the government, and thereby 
of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations, 
ample to divide even such a community [as one without divergent interests] into two 
great hostile parties. 
In order to form a just estimate of the full force of these advantages, without 
reference to any other consideration, it must be remembered that government - to 
fulfill the ends for which it is ordained, and more especially that of protection against 
external dangers - must in the present condition of the world be clothed with powers 
sufficient to call forth the resources of the community and be prepared at all times to 
command them promptly in every emergency which may possibly arise. For this 
purpose large establishments are necessary, both civil and military (including naval, 
where, from situation, that description of force may be required), with all the means 
necessary for prompt and effective action, such as fortifications, fleets, armories, arsen-
als, magazines, arms of all descriptions, with well-trained forces in sufficient number to 
wield them with skill and energy whenever the occasion requires it. The administration 
and management of a government with such vast establishments must necessarily 
require a host of employees, agents, and officers - of whom many must be vested with 
high and responsible trusts and occupy exalted stations accompanied with much 
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So hefty was the military role of treaty partner Great Britain that at the end of 1960 it 
was reported that until the close of 1965 the program of completing British military bases 
(to be launched in early 1961) would provide jobs for thousands of Cypriots, and that this, 
plus the spending of British troops stationed in Cyprus (estimated at £ 10,000,000 yearly), 
would exceed the total revenue of the Cyprus government at its 1960 level. 162 As late as 
August 21, 1963, the President accused London's colonial rule of having "rendered the 
Cyprus economy insecure by making it dependent to a large extent on military expendi-
ture, commerce and colonial services."163 
Actually, Makarios dropped any pressure on the U.K. to abandon its bases; his only 
complaint on this score between 1960 and 1963 arose when the British cut the strength of 
their garrison and he requested they bear in mind the effect upon the local living 
standard. 16.j Within a year after London had for six months haggled to hold nearly a 
hundred square miles for their bases they considered cutting back to seventy square miles, 
but were advised otherwise for fear of alarming Greek Cypriots.165 
VIII. PUBLIC SERVICE ApPOINTMENTS 
The EI,idence: Calhoun in the Dock 
Under Article 125 (1), the Public Service Commission was the appointing authority to 
the Public Service; 166 seven Commissioners were to be Greek and three Turkish Cyp-
riots.167 The Public Service was to be 70 percent Greek and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot. 16H 
Commission determinations of appointment or promotion to a new or vacant post 
were to be by simple majority vote, such simple majority vote always to include at least two 
Turkish Cypriots. But when the question related solely to a Greek Cypriot the majority 
was to include at least four Greek members. In selection of a Turkish Cypriot, the 
unanimous recommendation of three Turkish members was to bind the Commission; in 
influence and patronage. To meet the necessary expenses, large sums must be collected 
and disbursed, and for this purpose heavy taxes must be imposed, requiring a mul-
titude of officers for their collection and disbursement. The whole united must neces-
sarily place under the control of government an amount of honors and emoluments 
sufficient to excite profoundly the ambition of the aspiring and the cupidity of the 
avaricious, and to lead to the formation of hostile parties and violent party conflict and 
struggles to obtain the control of the government. 
J. CALHOUN, supra note 83, at 17 -18. 
162 CYPRUS - Old Problem, New Crisis, supra note 36, at 25-26. 
163 ld. at 29. 
164 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 170. 
165 ld. The British bases and Greek and Turkish troops on Cyprus were not officially a part of 
the NATO system. ld. at 174. 
For months, Cyprus has quietly allowed two British bases on the island, Akrotiri 
and Dhekelia, to be used by U.S., British and Italian planes carrying troops, supplies, 
casualties and diplomats to and from Beirut. 
Strictly speaking, the bases, just 60 miles from Lebanon, are only for purposes of 
British security, and then only if Cyprus agrees. But Cypriot officials concede they're 
not being "too strict." 
Worldgram: A Boostfrom the Cypriots, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 10, 1983, at 25 (Emphasis in 
original). 
166 CYPRCS CaNST. art. 125(1). 
167 CYPRUS CaNST. art. 124(2). 
168 CYPRUS CaNST. an. 123(1). 
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selection of a Greek Cypriot, the recommendation of fi ve Greek members was to bind the 
Commission .169 
During the colonial era Greek Cypriots had dominated most of the colonial bureau-
cracy; strict implementation of the seventy-thirty ratio would have disrupted the civil 
service and caused experienced civil servants to be fired.11° Within three years 2,000 civil 
service appointments were challenged on communal grounds and taken before the 
Supreme Constitutional Court. 111 Upon the May 1963 resignation of the President of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (a German, the well-known Heidelberg law professor 
Ernst Forsthoff) the tension generated by the seventy-thirty rule was never relieved by 
the Court. ln 
As early as spring 1961, Turkish Cypriots indicated concern that the Public Service 
was not being filled in the Constitutionally required seventy-thirty ratio. Turkish Cypriot 
members of the House of Representatives in retaliation refused to support extension of 
the tax laws. 173 
IX. THE CYPRIOT PERSONAL INCOME TAX DEADLOCK 
A. The Evidence: Calhoun in the Dock 
Article 188 (2) of the Cyprus Constitution provided that any tax law might continue 
to be enforced until December 31, 1960.174 Failure to agree upon timely tax legislation 
resulted in the introduction of a bill proposing a three month extension of the existing law 
to March 31, 1961. This December 1960 extension by the House produced no permanent 
tax law, so the Council of Ministers asked the House for a second three month extension. 
The Turkish Cypriot Representatives counteroflered with a two month extension. 175 The 
Greek Cypriot Representatives refused.176 
The March 31, 1961, House vote on a three month extension found twenty-five 
Greek Cypriot Representatives in favor but eleven Turkish Cypriot Representatives 
opposed; two Turkish Cypriot Representatives abstained. As a result, the bill failed 
because it lacked an Article 78 (2) concurrent majority.177 
As of March 31, 1961, the Republic lacked income tax legislation, but the complete 
tax legislation breakdown came in the December 18, 1961, House debate on new income 
tax legislation. Greek Cypriot Representatives supported a tax bill submitted by the 
executive branch, but the Turkish Cypriot Representatives proposed an annual House 
review of tax rates. m The executive-proposed bill obtained thirty Greek Cypriot Rep-
resentatives' votes, but eleven Turkish Cypriot Representatives opposed it (three Turkish 
Cypriot Representatives abstained). The Turkish Cypriot proposal won fourteen votes, all 
from Turkish Cypriot Representatives, against thirty votes opposed, all from Greek 
Cypriot Representatives. 179 
169 CYPRUS CONST. art. 125(3). 
170 Evriviades, supra note 35, at 243. 
171 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 175. 
172 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 82. 
173 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1041. 
174 CYPRUS CONST. art. 188(2). 
175 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 84. 
176 ld. at 85. 
177 ld. 
178 S. KVRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 88. 
179 ld. at 91. 
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As late as 1962, Turkish Cypriots suggested that a proposed annual income tax on 
foreign citizens and on foreign and domestic corporations be accepted if provisions as to 
the personal income tax on Cypriots be approved upon a three year basis only. The Greek 
Representatives could accept the first but not the second portion of the compromise.180 
The difficulty with the concurrent majority principle might be styled one of rule or 
ruin "ransom bargaining," given the tax vote retaliation over Public Service issues. This 
difficulty threatens democratic political negotiators bound to the unanimity principle with 
a deadlock of their democracy: 
The ideal would be to replace majority rule with unanimity, such as arises 
automatically in exchanges in a free market. If I have bread and you have 
cheese, a voluntary agreement between us to exchange some of my bread for 
some of your cheese is unanimous if we two constitute the whole of society, 
and it preserves some of the character of unanimity when there are more than 
two people because the rest of the population preserves what it had before 
our agreement was struck. Voting is different. If you, I and a third party 
constitute a community with unlimited majority rule, you and I can combine 
to take what we please from the third party. The problem of faction ... can be 
looked upon as arising because the essential unanimity required for commer-
cial transactions does not extend to transactions in the political realm. The 
proposed solution is to make unanimity a requirement in politics as well. 
Though unanimity is the ideal, it is not advocated in practice because of 
bargaining anomalies that would result. If unanimity is required for the 
passage of a new law, it becomes profitable for any man to hold the commu-
nity to ransom by threatening to vote against the law even when he personally 
stands to gain from having it passed. Imagine a community of 15 people, each 
with an income of $10 initially, and suppose the effect of a proposed law 
would be to raise every man's income to $11. Each man has an incentive to 
vote for the law, but Mr[.] 1 may announce that he will vote against it unless 
given a premium of, say $2.80 ($0.20 from each of the remaining voters) over 
and above the $1 he would get automatically. Since each voter is in a position 
to make such a threat, it becomes difficult to pass laws at all, and society 
becomes completely rigid or less prosperous than it might otherwise be. lsl 
If interfactional unanimity is required for a new law, it profits a rule or ruin bloc to 
hold others to ransom by threatening veto even if the vetoer, like the Turkish House 
element, would itself benefit from passage. Sometimes effectuation of the concurrent 
majority principle can facilitate not intedactional conciliation as anticipated by Calhoun, 
but intedactional confrontation. 
B. The Verdict 
Calhoun (who, inter alia, had served as a South Carolina state legislator, U.S. Con-
gressman, and U.S. Senator) was acutely aware of the prospect of democratic voters as 
plunderers: 
[N]othing is more difficult than to equalize the action of the government 
in reference to the various and diversified interests of the community; and 
nothing more easy than to pervert its powers into instruments to aggrandize 
180 Adams, supra note 29, at 484. 
181 D. USHER, THE ECONOMIC PREREQUISITE TO DEMOCRACY 116-17 (l98\). 
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and enrich one or more interests by oppressing and impoverishing the others; 
and this, too, under the operation of laws couched in general terms and 
which, on their face, appear fair and equal. 182 
How closely does this particular concern of Calhoun relate to the Cyprus income tax 
deadlock? 
In the few decades prior to independence the static, rural Cypriot economy was 
transformed into an entrepreneurial, export-oriented one. IH3 Yet the Turkish community 
reaped only a small share of this prosperity, and the gap widened after independence.184 
The Greek Cypriots, being wealthier, paid more in taxes. IS5 
The Turkish Cypriots during the early 1960s contributed only about £65,000 in taxes 
annually, which was some 9 percent of the income tax paid into the treasury. Greek and 
other Cypriots paid the remaining 91 percent. IS6 (Indeed, ever since, "Greek" Cyprus has 
offered the success story of a booming capitalism. 187) 
Turkish Cypriots offered a "very small contribution to the public expenditure."188 As 
President of the House of Representatives Glafcos Clerides argued on December 18, 
1961: "Surely the income from this tax, which comes mainly from the well-to-do Cypriot 
classes, will be used to cover the expenses of the five year plan, which plan will benefit not 
only the Greeks or the Turks but Cyprus as a whole .... "189 
Greek Cypriots believed it to be blackmail when the Turkish Cypriots decided to 
make nondiscriminatory income tax extension contingent upon strict implementation of 
independent Constitutional provisions, rather than agreeing to resolve intercommunal 
grievances through the judicial system.190 Witness President Makarios' November 30, 
1963, Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution: 
Past experience has shown that the right of separate majorities was not 
exercised by the Turkish Representatives because of disagreement with pro-
visions of the taxation legislation before the House. The Turkish Members 
used this right against taxation Bills neither because they disagreed with their 
provisions nor because such Bills were discriminatory against their community, 
but for matters unconnected with taxation legislation.191 (Emphasis added). 
182 J. CALHOUN, supra note 83, at 15. 
183 Worsley, supra note 23, at 11. 
184 Id. 
185 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 173. 
186 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 13. 
187 Worsley, supra note 23, at 15. 
188 Trombetas, supra note II, at 15. 
189 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 91 (citing House of Representatives, Minutes, Dec. 18, 1961, 
at 16-23 (translation by S. Kyriakides)). 
190 Evriviades, supra note 35, at 243. 
The Turkish Members voted against such legislation not because they were holding any 
opposite view or because it contained any unfavourable discrimination against their 
Community but they used their right of separate voting in order to compel Govern-
ment to yield to Turkish claims having no connection with any matter of taxation. 
C. TORNARITAS, supra note 99, at 47. 
191 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 23. 
Was it necessary ... to give the Turkish members in the House of Representatives 
an absolute veto power over all tax legislation? Would it not have been enough to 
protect against discriminatory taxes through the Supreme Constitution Court's power to 
void any law that discriminated against one of the two communities? 
Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1039. 
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Did the Cyprus income tax deadlock obtain relative to a Calhounian concurrent majority 
requirement? 
It did not. Recall that Calhoun called for Constitutional provisions" ... taking the 
sense of each interest or portion of community which may be unequally and injuriously 
affected by the action of the government separately, through its own majority or in some 
other way by which its voice may be fairly expressed, and to require the consent of each 
interest either to put or to keep the government in action."'~2 (Emphasis added). By 
allowing vetoes beyond the scope of Calhoun's concurrent majority requirement ("un-
equally and injuriously affected by the action"), the Cyprus Constitution invited ransom 
bargaining. 
Nor is this an incidental invocation of Calhoun. On the contrary, it was intersectional 
U.S. tax struggle over the protective tariff that first led Calhoun to develop his minority 
rights theories. '93 Unequal tax policy, and emphatically not North-South struggle over 
America's West, generated the Calhounian theory.'94 
Blindness to the fact that Calhoun long before had sensitively analyzed the minority 
veto principle at play in the Cyprus Constitution was suggested in the 1967 report of Dr. 
Karpat, "The concurrent m~orities of Greek and Turkish members of Parliament was 
[sic] required on matters concerning taxation in order to prevent discrimination."'95 A 
Calhounian concurrent majority, unlike the Cyprus Constitution tax veto, would have 
been limited to the discriminatorily taxed ("unequally and injuriously affected") parties to a 
given measure; it emphatically could not be wielded toward blackmail over nondis-
criminatory bills. 
Protest by Greek Cypriots was registered against "what amounted to final veto power 
held by the Turkish Cypriot representatives in the Legislative Assembly with respect to 
laws and decisions affecting the entire population."'96 Yet a Pulitzer Prize-winning biog-
,.2 J. CALHOUN, supra note 83, at 25. P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 29. 
193 M. COlT, JOHN C. CALHOUN: AMERICAN PORTRAIT 165-71 (1950). 
194 From Calhoun's excitement over the tariff question, we can see that slavery was not now 
foremost in his mind. What he did see - with his uncanny grasp of fundamentals -
was 'the great and vital point' as 'the industry of the country - which comprehends 
almost every interest.' Slavery, the tariff, banking - all were aspects of this one point. 
The issues did not make the division; the basic 'geographic dissimilarity' between North 
and South created the issues. In almost every aspect of their 'industries,' the expanding 
North and the retreating South were at odds. 
Already Calhoun saw that the South was fated to become a minority in the nation. 
And for him the minority question was basic. The Union, as he interpreted it, was 
devised for the protection of minorities; majorities could look after themselves. And the 
South, an economic minority within the Union, was being reduced to financial subservi-
ence by a hostile voting majority. 
That Calhoun's political theory was designed to cover the peculiar needs of the 
slaveholders is undeniable. That slavery was one of the reasons why his theory was 
developed is possible. Yet the gist of his doctrine - whatever may have been its 
conscious or unconscious origins - the protection of minority rights within the Union 
transcended the immediate issues of his own time, however vital they may have been. 
Whatever question or combination of questions led Calhoun to focus his interest on 
minorities at this period, the tariff was undoubtedly the immediate cause. Symbolically, 
at least, its importance can hardly be overestimated. 
!d. at 17l (quoting J. CALHOUN, The South Carolina Exposition (December 1828), reprinted in 6 REpORTS 
AND PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 1,31 (R. Cralle ed. 1968». 
195 Karpat, supra note 12, at 42. This is an exquisitely rare example of the use of the phrase 
"concurrent majority" in Cyprus Constitution discourse. 
196 F. Bunge, supra note 25, at 161. 
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raphy of Calhoun avers that one must "remember that under his [concurrent majority 
linked] nullification theories a state could suspend a law only in relation to itself, not for 
the rest of the country."197 
In all events, the failure of Cypriot personal income tax legislation was not the 
disaster one might expect. On April 1, 1961, President Makarios declared that the end to 
taxation "shakes the very existence of the Cyprus Republic, because no state can survive 
without taxation laws."19H But just as the Constitution had provided some national security 
through the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey- U.K. Treaty of Guarantee and the Cyprus-Greece-
Turkey Treaty of Alliance (both of which were of Constitutional force), so the Constitu-
tion encompassed a "fallback position" for taxation. 
On December 20,1961, the Greek Communal Chamber passed a bill imposing upon 
members of the Greek Community a "Personal Contribution" covering the amount 
included in the personal income tax bill defeated in the House. In effect, the Turkish 
Cypriot nullification vetoed the tax law only in relation to itself, not for the balance of the 
country. The Turkish Communal Chamber too passed its own income tax law. 199 The 
Supreme Constitutional Court upheld as Constitutional these enactments of both Com-
munal Chambers.2oo Ultimately, three different tax systems were applied: one each 
through the Communal Chambers plus a tax upon foreigners through the House of 
Representatives.201 
In brief, the Cypriot personal income tax deadlock did not obtain as to a Calhounian 
concurrent majority rule. Moreover, the Constitution included something of a communal 
fallback position in case of a national policymaking stalemate. 
X. THE MUNICIPALITIES ISSUE 
A. The Evidence: Calhoun in the Dock 
It was the Municipalities issue more than any other that provoked major Constitu-
tional conflict in CypruS.202 In June 1958, Turkish Cypriots became the first to launch 
communal town councils in the four largest towns, a move upheld by a 1959 British 
197 M. COlT, supra note 193, at 528. Comparably, the legal basis for the liberum veto in the Polish 
Parliament originated "in the statutes of Nieszawa (1454), which promised that no royal legislation 
would be introduced into a province without the consent of the its local sejmik [provincial assembly of 
nobility]." A REPUBLIC OF NOBLES: POLISH HISTORY TO 1864 xiv (j. Fedorwicz ed. 1982). Calhoun 
studied with appreciation the liberum veto. J. Calhoun, supra note 83, at 71-72. "This device 
[nullification] in Calhoun's mind was merely an aspect of a larger theory, namely, that of the 
'concurrent majority.' "2 R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 110 (1956). 
198 CYPRUS _ OLD PROBLEM, NEW CRISIS, supra note 36, at 27. 
199 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 92. Article 108(1), allowing for Community subsidies from 
mainland Greece and Turkey, likewise afforded something of a national income tax deadlock 
fallback position. CYPRUS CONST. art. 108(1). 
200 The Court's position with reference to the legality of the actions of both Communal 
Chambers is reflected in the following case involving the Greek Communal Chamber. 
"In the Matter of the Tax Collection Law No. 31 of 1962, and Hji Kyriacos and Sons 
Ltd. of Famagusta," (Case No. 298162), in Reports of Cases of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court of Cyprus (Cyprus: The Printing Office of the Republic, 1963), Vo!' 5, at 22-23. 
!d. at 92 n.56. 
201 Evriviades, supra note 35, at 244. 
202 T. EHRLICH, supra note 28 at 44; R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 175. 
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ruling. Pressures during the 1955-1959 interval against Cypriots crossing communal lines 
to do business developed a sense of economic partition within each community.203 
Articles 173-178 of the Constitution provide that each of the five largest towns divide 
into Greek and Turkish municipalities.204 Article 173 (1) provides: 
Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of the 
Republic, that is to say, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos by 
the Turkish inhabitants thereof: 
Provided that the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall 
within four years of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution 
examine the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the 
aforesaid towns shall continue.20; 
Article 173 (1) was the most important of a variety of detailed Constitutional protections 
for the national minority;206 separate Municipalities were functioning when the Republic 
was born, albeit their precise territorial jurisdiction was undefined.207 
Acting under Article 177 the President and Vice-President appointed Committees of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots in each town; these Committees failed to define the areas of 
the Municipal Councils.208 Article 188 (2) provided for existing laws relating to the 
municipalities to be effective for six months post-independence.209 The House of Rep-
resentatives eight times passed short-term extensions of the provisions of Article 188 (2) 
until a December 1962 negotiations collapse.210 
At the December 31, 1962, House meeting Representative Halit Ali Riza declared of 
a Turkish bill: 
We believe that, taking into consideration the complexity of the question 
not only politically but also technically, much more time should be allowed for 
such discussions to continue, which we hope and expect would be with an 
open mind and elasticity within the framework and provisions of the Con-
stitution and not based on fixed, unchangeable ideas and assumptions; 
... With every good will and intention ... we have submitted this bill of which 
the effect, if approved, by the House, would be to prolong the operation of 
the existing Municipal Corporation Laws for a certain period of time; we 
suggest a year but will accept any reasonable period.211 
Greek Representatives believed continuation of the existing law meant acceptance of the 
203 Adams, supra note 29, at 488; S. K YRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 94. 
204 CYPRUS CONST. arts. 173-178. 
205 CYPRUS CaNST. art. 173(1). 
206 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1036-37. Articles 87 and 89 anticipated that the laws concerning 
municipal administration in these five towns must be supplemented by Communal Chamber Legisla-
tion. CYPRUS CONST. arts. 87 and 89. 
207 Evriviades, supra note 35, at 244. 
208 P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 34. 
Subject to the provisions of Articles 173 to 178, both inclusive, each municipality in 
any such town shall exercise its jurisdiction and perform all its functions respectively 
within a region the limits of which shall be fixed for each municipality by agreement of 
the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. 
CYPRUS CONST. art. 177. 
209 CYPRUS CONST. art. 188(2). 
210 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 95. 
211 ld. at 99 (citing House of Representatives, Minutes, Dec. 31, 1962, at 2). 
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pre-independence separate Municipalities.212 The Turkish Representatives voted for the 
bill but all of the Greek Representatives voted against it.213 
On January 2, 1963, the Council of Ministers by appointing Improvement Boards 
attempted to create Municipal Councils to fill the gap left by the statute which had expired 
on December 31, 1962. The Council of Ministers intended to bring under unified control 
both Greek and Turkish sections of the Municipalities.21 ' 
B. The Verdict 
In response, the Turkish Communal Chamber applied to the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court for a ruling on the validity of the Council order. On April 25, 1963, the 
Court held that the Council's order violated the Constitutional requirement that separate 
Municipalities be established.21:i But for the first time, after more than two years of 
Supreme Constitutional Court unanimity, the Greek Justice, Michalakis Triantafyllides, 
dissented.216 
President Makarios had stated while the Municipalities dispute was pending before 
the Court that he would not comply with an adverse decision.217 It was due to this affront 
that President of the Supreme Constitutional Court Forsthoff resigned his post.218 
In short, the Municipalities deadlock did not obtain because a Turkish Cypriot 
minority, hewing to the Constitution, abused its concurrent majority Constitutional veto 
power. It obtained because the nationwide majority failed to hew to the Constitution. 
Former President of the Supreme Constitutional Court Forsthoff on December 30, 1963, 
had this exchange with a correspondent: 
212 S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 99. 
213 Id. at 100. 
214 Id. at 101. 
215 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1042. 
The Court's other grounds were: (1) The Council's order was not properly pro-
mulgated because the vice-president had refused to sign it, although he had no right to 
refuse under article 57 of the Constitution; (2) regulation of municipal administration 
was reserved to the House of Representatives under articles 78, 87, 89, and 173-177 of 
the Constitution; and (3) the pre-independence law was not intended to apply to towns. 
The Turkish Communal Chamber and the Council of Ministers, Supreme Constitu-
tional Court, Apr. 25, 1963, 5 R.S.C.C. 59, 74-77. The Court's opinion includes no 
reasoning to support its conclusion that an order of the Council is invalid if not 
promulgated by the vice-president, and it is by no means clear what action to force his 
signature would be appropriate. But the other grounds of the Court's opinion are 
separately as well as collectively persuasive. 
Id. at 1042 n.90. 
216 Ehrlich,supra note 21, at 1042 (citing 5 R.S.C.C. at 96); S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 102. 
217 Z. NEDJATIGIL, supra note 30, at 7 n.24. Assuredly, Turkish Cypriot proposals as to territorial 
division of the Municipalities may have been impractical. Recalled President Makarios: 
The Vice-President proposed that: 
'The frontage of all property abutting on any street will be measured and if the 
total length of the frontage of the property belonging to the members of the Greek 
community in that street is greater, then that street will be included in the sector of the 
Greek Municipality. The same principle will apply in the case of a street where the total 
length of the frontages of the property belonging to the members of the Turkish 
community is greater.' 
INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 23. 
218 Z. NEDJATIGIL, supra note 30, at 7. 
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Q. Can you briefly state the last incident in the chain of events which led to 
your resignation? 
A. These criticisms against the Constitution increased as time went on and 
when the question of establishing separate municipalities in the five main 
towns was brought before the Court it was insisted that the establishment 
of such separate municipalities was not practicable. The Court formulated 
its decision with utmost care in order to make it possible for a compromise 
solution.219 . 
Xl. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CYPRUS CONSTITUTION 
29 
Tensions in Cyprus had been building rapidly over the latter half of 1963, but if any 
one event can be said to have set the stage for violence, it was the Makarios November 30, 
1963, announcement to Vice-President Kuchuk and December 5,1963, announcement to 
the Guarantor Powers proposing thirteen m~or Constitutional revisions: 22o 
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the 
Republic to be abandoned. 
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of 
the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his 
duties. 
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Tur-
kish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present 
the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by 
the Turkish Members of the House. 
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for 
the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to 
perform his duties. 
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for 
enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished. 
6. Unified Municipalities to be established. 
7. The administration of Justice to be unified. 
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be 
abolished. 
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and the Defence Forces 
to be determined by Law. 
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be 
modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. 
219 [d. at 73. Claimed Vice-President Kuchuk: 
Whenever the Turks tried to make use of any of their constitutional rights, they 
were met with the same pre-conceived intention to undermine the relevant constitu-
tional provisions with a view to rendering the Constitution inoperative. The argument 
that the three years' experience has made it clear that it is necessary to revise the 
Constitution is nothing but a pretext to take away the just rights of the Turks. 
In short, whenever a crisis arose as regards the implementation of the Constitution 
and the Turks were forced to rely on their constitutional rights, the Greek side came 
out with a counter claim to rescind that part of the Constitution which provided for the 
Turkish community some powers to make their views heard in the general administra-
tion of the Republic's affairs. 
S. KYRIAKIDES, supra note 31, at 107-08. 
220 Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1043; Evriviades, supra note 35, at 245. 
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11. The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission to be 
reduced from ten to five. 
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple 
majority. 
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.221 
The effect of these thirteen points would have been to abolish many provisions for 
separate communal institutions and create an integrated unitary state with limited 
guarantees for Turkish Cypriots.m This revision program would repeal basic articles for 
which the Turks had fought hard:223 "It would have ended the veto embodied in the 
powers of the President and Vice-President, and in the separate majorities required for 
certain laws in the House of Representatives."224 When the government of Turkey 
rebuffed these proposals, as the President must have anticipated, he refused its rejec-
tion.225 
Within days, fighting was sparked on Cyprus.2a8 Throughout 1964 and 1965 neither 
the Greek Cypriot nor the Turkish Cypriot community allowed complete freedom of 
movement to their counterparts notwithstanding the best efforts of United Nations 
representatives.227 
With no prior consultation, Nicosia on January 1. 1964, abrogated its treaties with 
Greece, Turkey and Britain.22H In February 1964 London appealed to the U.N. Security 
Council, which agreed on a resolution authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping force for Cyp-
ruS: 229 "Russia, contrary to earlier gloomy forecasts in London and Washington, did not 
obstruct the move for a UN force, despite her known disapproval of the financial and 
legal aspects of previous peace-keeping operations."23o On March 14, 1964, the Canadian 
advance guard of the U.N. force flew into the island.231 This Security Council move itself 
demonstrates the launching of a major operation through the Security Council's own 
concurrent majority policy making formula.232 
XII. CONCLUSION 
A. The 1960 Constitution 
The destruction of the Cyprus Constitution obtained upon the calculated repudia-
tion thereof by majority faction leaders. The pro-minority, concurrent majority devices 
221 The text of President Makarios' November 30, 1963. Proposals to Amend the Cyprus 
Constitution is found in INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES. supra note 14. at 20-28. 
222 R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 179. 
223 Ehrlich. supra note 21, at 1044. 
22. R. STEPHENS. supra note 32, at 179. 
225 Ehrlich. supra note 21. at 1044. 
226 [d. 
227 [d. at 1052. 
228 R. STEPHENS. supra note 32. at 185. 
229 [d. at 189-90. 
230 [d. at 190. 
231 [d. at 191. 
232 But Dr. Peter F. Drucker contends that it is of the essence of the concurrent majority that it 
can never be rendered an official part of any effective government. Drucker. A Key to American 
Politics: Calhoun's Pluralism. in JOHN C. CALHOUN 133, 135 n.3 (J. Thomas. ed. 1968). The Security 
Council concurrent majority mechanism derived from Calhounian inspiration. Franklin. The Roman 
Origin and the American Justiftcation of the Tribunitial or Veto Power in the Charter of the United Nations, 22 
TUL. L. REV. 24.25-26 (1947). 
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therein did not foil Cypriot Constitutional democracy. The fact alone that the Cyprus 
concurrent majority apparatus did not preclude popular government signals that the 
concurrent majority principle can remain of at least theoretical interest to comparative 
constitutional scholars. 
However, Cypriot political frustration over the Cypriot personal income tax veto did 
demonstrate that the draftsmen of the Constitution (the Joint Constitutional Commission) 
failed to do their homework and consult Calhoun when incorporating the concurrent 
majority. They were, apparently, ignorant that a veto is best used to defend unequally and 
injuriously affected minorities.233 Article 78 (2), as to its overly inclusive taxation subject 
matter, needlessly invited ransom bargaining deadlock. 
Moreover, the draftsmen of Article 78 (2) seem to have failed to learn from Calhoun 
as to not only the subject matter of a legislative concurrent majority requirement, but as to 
the optimal procedural criteria thereof. President Makarios in his Proposals to Amend the 
Cyprus Constitution gave an expansive reading to the House concurrent majority rule: 
"If, for example, 35 Greek Members and 7 Turkish Members vote in favour of a Bill, i.e. 
the Bill receives a total of 42 votes in favour, it can be defeated by 8 Turkish votes. Even 2 
Turkish Representatives can defeat a Bill if only 3 Turkish Representatives take part in 
the vote."234 
Other analysis of the constitution has agreed with Makarios's two-Representative veto 
interpretation.235 Cyprus Attorney General Criton G. Tornaritis, Q.C., plausibly said that 
even a solitary Turkish Representative "if two of them were present and voted"236 could 
veto tax legislation. 
But concurrent majority theory is to facilitate rule by the bulk of each and all crucial 
blocs. The approach better than the unit veto would be that bills supported by a national 
majority could be vetoed only by most of the Turkish Representatives (eight of fifteen). 
This prudent eight-man rule has been the Constitutional reading of several Cyprus 
scholars .237 
Calhoun was particularly alert to the fact that the ten-man ancient Roman tribune-
ship employed a veto over governmental measures not as individual Tribunes but only 
through their own "majority."2:JB This could suggest his opposition to a Turkish Cypriot 
Representative unit veto.239 
The timebomb House of Representatives unit veto was a political (and Constitutional) 
catastrophe waiting to happen. That prospective Article 78 (2) unit veto explosion, like 
233 The principle of separate majorities, if it is to be applied at all, must obviously only be 
introduced by reference to well delineated criteria and only (a) for those classes of 
legislation which could directly encroach upon the interests of the Communities and (b) 
where no other effective remedy can be found. This, of course, was not so under the 
1960 Constitution .... 
P. POLYVIOU, supra note 51, at 29. 
234 INSTITUTE OF GREEK-AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 20, 22. 
235 Id. at 11. 
236 C. TORNARITIS, supra note 99, at 47. 
237 Doumas, supra note 27, at 80; Adams, supra note 29, at 484. 
238 J. Calhoun, supra note 144, at 109, 270. 
239 Indeed, among Rome's Tribunes a unit veto obtained against their collective majority veto: 
The only effective check which the Senate had upon the proceedings of the Tribunes 
was, that one Tribune could put his veto upon the acts of his colleagues. Consequently, 
by securing the support of one member of the body, the Senate were [sic] able to 
prevent the other Tribunes from carrying out their plans. 
W. SMITH, A SMALLER HISTORY OF ROME 121 (1879). 
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the Article 78 (2) ransom bargaining crisis which did transpire, was avoidable by prior 
consultation with Calhoun. Seeming ignorance of Calhoun on the part of the Legal 
Advisor to the Joint Constitutional Commission, Professor of Law Marcel Bridel, and on 
the part of Commission legal advisors who were Greek and Turkish nationals - upon 
whom fell the burden of work240 - might however be understandable.24 ! 
B. The 1983-1984 Situation 
In the November 15, 1983, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declaration, 
Denktash told his countrymen that the aim was not to "hinder but facilitate the establish-
ment of genuine federation" between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.242 Many 
observers in Istanbul believed the Denktash declaration was intended mainly to gain a 
better bargaining position toward equal intercommunal partnership in a projected Cyp-
rus federation. 243 Turkish Cypriot press reports stressed that the November 15 declara-
tion was "not a secession" but aimed at attaining equal bargaining status for the Turkish 
Cypriots with the Greek Cypriots.244 
Mr. Denktash on November 17, 1983, proposed immediate negotiations with Greek 
Cypriots for an interim government on CypruS.245 Greek Cypriots by 1983 long had 
insisted upon a federal Cyprus, while Turkish Cypriots had pushed for a confedera-
tion.246 Averred Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister Kenan Atakol: "We are looking for a 
240 One section of the Zurich-London Agreements created a Joint Constitutional Commis-
sion, composed of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and 
the Greek and Turkish governments, with legal advisors. The job of the Commission 
was to draft a constitution for the Republic of Cyprus, building on the basic structure 
agreed upon at Zurich and London. The Commission met for the first time on Apr. 13, 
1959, under the leadership of Marcel Bridel (a professor of law and one-time rector of 
the University of Lausanne), whose official title was Legal Advisor to the Commission. 
Less than a year later, the draft constitution was completed in Lausanne, Switzerland. 
The task of amplifying specific constitutional provisions in the framework set up by 
the Zurich-London Agreements was not an easy one. The burden of work fell upon the 
legal advisors who were Greek and Turkish nationals, since the British authorities had 
no representatives on the commission and the Cypriots were comparatively inexperi-
enced in such matters. However, when the draft constitution was submitted to Great 
Britain, she informed the other interested nations that Her Majesty's Government had 
no comments, additions, or deletions to make. 
Adams, supra note 29, at 476. 
24! "Yet several Greek writers have referred to the Constitution as an 'Anglo-Saxon' inspiration." 
Ehrlich, supra note 21, at 1038 n.74 (citing Antonopoulas, Les Tendances Constituionnelles des Etats 
Ayant Accede Recemment a L'lndependance, 15 Revue Hellenique de Droit International 307, 311 (1962); 
and Tenekides, La Condition InternationaLe de La RepubLique de Chypre, 6 Annuaire Francais de Droit 
International 133, 155 (1960)). But as late as 1968 even distinguished Harvard University jurispru-
dent Carl J. Friedrich could discuss the Constitution in a chapter entitled Cyprus: The Dangers of 
DuaLism without mentioning Calhoun. C. FRIEDRICH, TRENDS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 123-28 (1968). 
242 Rogal, supra note 3, at 59; Turk Cypriots Will Draft Constitution, supra note I, at 14A, col. 1. 
243 Cohen, supra note 6, at 12, col. 3. 
244 Bruce, Turkish Cyprus declared independence: a mouse that roared?, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 16, 
1983, at 16, col. I, col. 4. 
245 Bruce, supra note 4, at II, col. 3. 
246 !d. at 14, col. 3. 
Having proclaimed a separate state, Mr[.] Denktash announced that he is now 
anxious to talk about federation. This is like trying to build a bridge from the middle of 
the river. The Turkish Cypriots have declared their independence or secession from 
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bizonal, bicommunal federal republic. In our declaration we said that we extended a 
peaceful hand to the Greek Cypriots. If they refuse to negotiate with us, the declaration 
will show the whole world that we believe we have as much right to self~determination as 
the Greek Cypriots have."247 
The two blocs by late 1983 already had reached agreements on the sharing of 
electricity and water, as well as sewage control in the country's divided capital, Nicosia.24H 
By 1984 Cyprus President Spiros Kyprianou no longer demanded a strong central 
government and anticipated greater autonomy for the Turkish Cypriot administration 
than Greek Cypriots theretofore had been willing to concede.249 
C. The Concurrent Majority and Cyprus: 1984-1985 
Belgium, Switzerland, and, ironically, Lebanon have been cited as precedents for 
Constitutional intercommunal conciliation in Cyprus.250 During the nineteen-sixties 
commentators repeatedly held Lebanon251 up to Cyprus as a good example.252 But by 
1984, effectively partitioned-Cyprus was being held up to charnelhouse-Lebanon253 as a 
good example for her.254 Comparative constitutional scholars cannot be overly confident 
the Republic, but they have also made a declaration of dependence on Turkey. Every 
facet of the northern state, which was complete in most respects before 15 November, 
illustrates that: Turkish currency, Turkish newspapers, Turkish time, Turkish soldiers 
(to the number of perhaps 30,000), Turkish settlers and workers imported to work the 
fields, Turkish airlines and the Turkish flag. In an absurdly revealing fashion, the 
authorities even use the Turkish word for the island ('Kibris') when speaking or writing 
in English. Not even the most consecrated Greek Cypriot calls it "Kypros" in the same 
way. 
Hitchens, Clever Turkish politics, THE SPECTATOR, Nov. 26, 1983, at 3. 
247 Davidson, supra note 2, at 38. 
248 Editorial, Cyprus rift, Christian Sci. Mon., Nov. 18, 1983, at 21, col. 1. 
249 Wiznitzer, Greeks and Turks talk past each other in trying to solve the Cyprus deadlock, Christian Sci. 
Mon., Feb. 1, 1984, at 8, col. 3. 
250 Adams, supra note 29, at 489. 
251 Lebanon offers an example of a modern democratic state based on confessional-
communal organization. Prior to the establishment of the Lebanese state the isolationist 
Christians claimed that the Muslim Arabs would never forego their own brand of 
nationalism, while the Muslims demanded unity with Syria and opposed the idea of an 
independent Lebanon as politically non-viable. Eventually the Lebanon gained inde-
pendence in 1943, based on an inter-faith National Pact which provided for the political 
association of various cultural groups. The constitutional order of the Lebanon is based 
on communal-confessional differences which are far more pronounced than in Cyprus. 
Lebanon was 'a political compromise, not an ideological situation,' and this compro-
mise, more than any other factor, accounts for the country's survival and the rudiments 
of a Lebanese political identity. 
Trombetas, supra note 11, at 41-42. 
252 As the Lebanon provides an example of co-operation between Christians and Moslems 
and Latin and Orthodox, so Cyprus might bring Greek Orthodox and Turkish Moslem 
together. Perhaps it might in time be joined by another mixed state bringing Jews 
together with Arabs in a union of Israel and Jordan - though it must be admitted that 
at present such a prospect is extremely remote. 
R. STEPHENS, supra note 32, at 218. 
253 I. RABINOVICH, THE WAR FOR LEBANON, 1970-1983 (1984). 
254 A new term has appeared in diplomatic dispatches reporting on Lebanon's chaos: 'The 
Cyprus solution.' 
In plain language, it implies a physical separation of Lebanon's feuding religious 
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if they prescribe rather than describe and explain. 
Those Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalists who might not fanatically 
have favored enosis or taxim yet still have found attractive the goals of autonomy and 
virtually complete selt~determination for their peoples could have appreciated this con-
clusion by August O. Spain in his The Political Theory ojJohn C. Calhoun: 255 
Basically, Calhoun devoted himself to the task of justifying autonomy 
and practically complete selt~determination for the South, which to him and 
to many of his contemporaries represented a more genuine unity of interest 
and culture than the larger and politically articulated union of the United 
States. The particular form of his political and constitutional theory was 
largely determined by the fact that the South as such had no political organi-
zation and could, therefore, be distinguished from the North only by making 
the States the significant political entities. However, Calhoun was also moti-
vated by an honest interest in the protection of minorities and by a belief in 
the efficacy of decentralization in government. If he could have divorced the 
term 'nationalism' from its connotation of complete political unity and cen-
tralization, he could well have called himself a Southern nationalist.256 
As Prof. George F. Kateb explains with words relevant to Cyprus: 
[T]here may be situations in which a minority group in society stands in 
constant peril from the majority. There may be situations in which a society is 
fundamentally divided into a permanent majority and a permanent minority, 
and in which the majority does not extend civil feelings toward the minority. 
A normal society could not exist in the absence of widespread civil feelings, no 
matter how much diversity it contains, no matter how many factions and 
conflicts of interest it contains. But a certain group within it may, for one 
reason or another, arouse the murderous animosity of the rest. Ethnic, 
religious, racial, and linguistic minorities come to mind from our own present 
experience. The rights of these groups could perhaps be designated as 'inter-
ests,' if the meaning of that word were extended. Calhoun's analysis would 
apply. It would then be an open question whether the majority would choose 
to be just and respect minority rights by complying with the arrangements 
meant to protect them. In any case, whether they did so or not, right is on the 
side of the minority.257 
sects and political clans. Such a separation has existed on Cyprus since Turkish troops 
invaded the island in 1974. 
It has not solved what is known as 'the Cyprus problem,' but it has eliminated 
bloodshed and intercommunal strife. 
Boroweic, Lebanon: Specter now a nightmare, Evening Journal (Wilmington, Del.), Feb. 8, 1984, at A 14, 
col. 2. (Andrew Boroweic is a correspondent for the Chicago Sun-Times based in Nicosia.) 
255 A. SPAIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (1968). 
256 [d. at 258-59. Compare Spain's choice of words ("autonomy and practically complete self-
determination") with these: "[T]he aim of the first Republic of Cyprus, in the words of a British 
publicist, was that 'the amount of unity to be achieved in the island shall be that minimum which is 
compatible with the maximum expression of communal individuality.' " Adams, supra note 29, at 
488-89 (citing Baker, The Settlement in Cyprus, POL. Q. 248 Ouly- Sept. 1959». 
257 Kateb, The Majority Principle: Calhoun and His Antecedents, 84 POL. SCI. Q. 583,604-05 (1969). 
Found Canada's internationally respected comparative constitutional scholar Prof. Edward 
McWhinney: 
Whether any positive law instrument, however carefully drafted, could have 
yielded a viable, working constitution for Cyprus, granted the nature and history of the 
vested interest and commitments, in Cyprus, of the two 'parent' nations on the Greek 
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and Turkish mainlands, and also the degree of mutual intransigence of these two 
parent nations, is open to question. Certainly, it seems fair to conclude that the 
influence of the constitution itself in the exacerbation of the racial strife between the 
Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus itself was at the most peripheral. On the 
whole, and as an exercise in rationalised constitutionalism - in the postulation of an 
'ideal-type' model for the institutional moderation of power - it seems to have been an 
eminently fair and reasonable document, .... 
E. MCWHINNEY, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING FOR A MULTINATIONAL WORLD 76-77 (1966). 
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